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A
S E R I E S
O F
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P O L I C Y:
BEING A FULL
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
O F

All Our Measures
Ever since the Year 1721, inclusive;
AND ESPECIALLY
Of Our late Most Honourable
CONVENTION with SPAIN.

Denique sit, quod vis, simplex duntaxat, & Unum.
HOR.

L O N D O N:
Printed for T. COOPER, at the Globe in Pater-
Noster-Row. MDCCXXXIX.

3,030,350

A
S E R I E S
O F
WISDOM and POLICY.

CONSIDERING my Design, I hope my Brother *Panegyrist*, from whom I have borrowed the principal Part of my *Title Page* *, will excuse the Liberty I have taken. Having thus made my Compliments to my Fellow-labourer, I must inform the few Readers I may chance to meet with, of a Secret they do not perhaps know, which is, that we Gentlemen who write upon one Side of the Question, *do not write to be read, but to be paid.*

Now to my Subject: I must begin with observing, that some *short-sighted* Politicians were, in former Times, of Opinion, that though we might sometimes be at Peace with *France*, yet it could never be our Interest to have a close Friendship with, or to put a thorough Confidence in, that Nation ; that an Union of Councils between *France* and *Spain*, might be of as dangerous Consequence to the Interests and Trade of *Great Britain*, as an Union of these two Crowns could be, to the Liberties of *Europe* ; and

* See *A Series of Wisdom and Policy manifested in a Review, &c.*
printed for Roberts. 1735.

that for this Reason we ought to promote, as much as possible, a good Understanding between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*; and to foment, if possible, continual Jealousies and Animosities between *France* and *Spain*.

The Affront put upon the Court of *Spain* by that of *France*, soon after the Death of the late Regent, afforded, as these Politicians thought, an excellent Handle for both these Purposes; and the defensive Alliance which was thereupon entered into between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, might, by our Accession, said they, have afforded US an Opportunity of having the *French* drove out of *Hispaniola*, and some other Islands in the *West-Indies*, which would have entirely prevented their incroaching upon us in the Sugar Trade. Nay by such an Accession, these Politicians insisted, we might have got every Dispute between *Spain* and Us settled to our own liking, and every thing rectified that was amiss in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, except that of uniting the *Empire* and *Spain* under one Monarch, which Union was, at the Time of that Treaty, thought, by some Gentlemen, not altogether consistent with the Balance of Power in *Europe*; though the preventing of this Union was made one of the most heavy Complaints against that Treaty, by other Gentlemen, *then out of Place*, who have since been pleased to set in the most terrible Light, the *overgrown* Power of the *House of Austria*.

But the incomparable Person, who is my most bountiful Patron, and who, to the great Advantage, and to the great Honour of this Nation, has continued so long to have a considerable Influence, soon saw the Weakness of this political Way of Reasoning; and therefore, as soon as he got himself firmly seated, he endeavoured to change our whole Scene
of

of Politicks, by laying down, so far as I can guess, the following Maxims as the *Basis* of his future Conduct. That as the wisest Man cannot foresee all, nor command any, future Events, a wise *State-pilot* will never give himself much Trouble, about those Misfortunes which may happen to his Country, if they be such as will not probably happen while he is at the Helm. And that a *Prime State-pilot*, if he was not himself bred a General, ought of all things to avoid a War ; because, if it be successful, the General in Chief will eclipse his Glory, and perhaps retrench his Power ; and if the War should prove unsuccessful, he may be made to answer for the Misfortune.

These were, I suppose, the two chief Maxims he laid down for his future Conduct ; but as these were of a private Nature, they were reserved in *Petto*, and the only Maxim publickly avowed was, *That the greatest Happiness a trading Nation could enjoy was Peace* ; though here too, I must suppose, there was reserved in *Petto* a Proviso, That it should not diminish our Debts nor our Taxes. Which Proviso, I must suppose, proceeded from another Maxim likewise reserved in *Petto*, That in order to keep *some Folks* in good Humour, a large and unaccountable Civil List, great Debts, and heavy Taxes were necessary ; and this, I suppose, he wisely foresaw, made another Maxim indispensable, That in order to bind the People to their good Behaviour, a numerous standing Army must always be kept up.

Having, as I suppose, laid these Maxims down, he easily foresaw, that the only Means by which he could propose to enjoy an uninterrupted Tranquility, was by keeping up a close Correspondence with France, and taking Care not to enter into any Mea-

sures but such as might be agreeable to that Court ; nor to refuse entring into such Measures as they might think fit to propose. Provided he did not disoblige his *Most Christian Majesty*, he concluded, that he might quarrel with any Power in *Europe*, or with all in their Turn, without involving the Nation into such a War as might disturb his Repose. *France*, he knew, was the only Nation in *Europe* that could, with any Probability of Success, play the *Pretender* upon us ; and though they should fail in this, yet as we could not well carry on a War against *France*, without forming or joining in an Alliance with some of the Powers upon the Continent, such a War, he foresaw, might render some one or other of our Generals as considerable, as the glorious Duke of *Marlborough* was in the Reign of Queen *Anne*, which would of course make him but an *Appendix* to the *General*, instead of having all our Generals made nothing but *Appendixes* to him.

These were dangerous Effects which were justly to be apprehended from a War with *France* ; whereas from a War with any of the other Powers of *Europe*, he had nothing to fear but the Interruption and Decay of our Trade, which, I must suppose, gave him no Uneasiness ; because the Decay of our Trade could not, he imagined, be very sensibly felt in his Lifetime ; and no wise Man will give himself any Trouble about what may happen to his Country after his Death.

These, I say, I must suppose to be some of the wise Maxims which my most bountiful Patron laid down, as the Basis of his future Conduct in the high Post to which he had, by *Ways and Means*, raised himself ; and if I am allowed to suppose these to have been his Maxims, (as much as he has been accused

cused of Blundering and Unsteddiness) I hope I shall be able to shew, that according to these Maxims, and such other as I shall hereafter, *en passant*, take Notice of, *his Conduct has been wise, steady, and uniform.*

He had scarce got that Influence, which, happily for us, he still retains, when he found an Opportunity of shewing a signal Instance of his good Will towards *France*. We had found Means, a few Years before, to lay a high Obligation upon the *Emperor*, and to raise great Animosities between *France* and *Spain*. We had procured the *Emperor* the large and fruitful Island of *Sicily*, in Exchange for the small and barren Island of *Sardinia*; and we had got the *French* to carry War almost into the Heart of *Spain*. The *French* soon began to see their Mistake, and therefore they endeavoured to atone for their former Conduct, by procuring for *Spain* an honourable Peace with us, and making a Breach between us and the *Emperor*; both which, by the Assistance of my worthy Patron, they accomplished: for, by his Means, they prevailed upon us to conclude a separate Treaty with *Spain* in the Year 1721; and at the same Time, and at the same Place, a defensive Alliance with *France* and *Spain*, to which the *Emperor* was not so much as invited to accede, though by an express Article it was agreed, that the *Dutch* should; so that it seemed as if this Alliance had been intended expressly against the *Emperor*, our Ally in the War against *Spain*.

This of course established a good Understanding between *France* and *Spain*, and restored us to the good Graces of the *Spanish* Faction in *France*, by convincing the *Orleans* Faction, that in case of the Death of their King, they could not depend upon

us for any Support or Assistance ; but it highly dis-
obliged the *Emperor*, and was perhaps one of the
principal Motives for his establishing the *Ostend Com-*
pany.

However, notwithstanding the Article in this se-
parate Treaty between *Spain* and us, by which his
late Majesty obliged himself, " To cause to be re-
stored all the Ships of the *Spanish* Fleet taken by
that of *England* in 1718, with the Guns, Sails,
Rigging, and other Equipage, in the Condition
they were *then* in ; or else the Value of those
which had been sold, at the *same Price* the Pur-
chasers had given for them : " And notwithstanding
his late Majesty's Letter to the King of *Spain*,
which gave the *Spaniards* a Pretence for insisting up-
on the Restitution of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, a
Pretence they have never yet in express Terms de-
parted from : I say, notwithstanding both these ex-
traordinary Compliances, this was an advantageous
and an honourable Treaty for Us as well as *Spain* ;
because we thereby got all the former Treaties be-
tween the two Crowns, except that of 1670, ex-
pressly confirmed ; and because the King of *Spain*
thereby promised to order all *British* Effects seized in
the Dominions of *Spain* at the Beginning of the
War, to be restored.

'Tis true, some ill-natur'd Criticks may observe,
that as these Effects were seized contrary to an ex-
press Article in the Treaty of 1667, they ought not
only to have been restored, but to have been re-
stored with Damages ; and that therefore this Treaty
was not very honourable on our Side, because we
accepted of less than we were entitled to by the Rules
of common Justice ; but Peace is the greatest Blef-
sing a trading Nation can enjoy, therefore we ought
never

never to insist upon all we are entitled to; and as we had seized no Effects belonging to the *Spaniards*, and had therefore nothing to give in Return, it must be allowed, that the obtaining of a promise for making a *simple Restitution*, without any Damages, was a great Point gained. It was such a Point as clearly shewed the superior Art and Skill of our Negotiators, and the great Kindness of *France* in assisting Us to obtain such a Promise; for though that Promise was never fully performed, yet the *Wisdom* of our *Negotiators*, and the *Good-will* of *France* towards Us, can never be forgot.

It may likewise be objected by the same sort of political Criticks, that as our Admiral received Thanks, in the most publick Manner, for what he did in the Year 1718, the *Spanish* Ships he took, belonged certainly to Us by the Rights of War, and therefore it was not altogether so honourable for Us to oblige ourselves to restore them; at least, we ought to have insisted that his Catholick Majesty, upon his part, should oblige himself to restore all the *British* Merchant Ships taken by the *Spanish* Privateers during the War; but in this Case we were told by the *French*, who then were, and have ever since been, our good Friends; and who must be allowed to understand both *Treaty-making and Treaty-breaking* as well as any Nation in *Europe*, that there was a very great Difference between our Merchantmen taken by the *Spaniards*, and the *Spanish* Men of War taken by Us. The former were taken after a *Declaration of War*, and therefore belonged to the Captors *jure belli*; whereas the latter were taken before any *Declaration of War*, and, as the *Spaniards* said, without any Act of Hostility committed by them, and therefore could not belong to the Captors.

Besides,

Besides, the *French* told Us, it was inconsistent with the Dignity of Sovereign Princes to trouble their Heads about *Peddling Merchant-men*; and the *French* are so good Judges of what is called the Point of Honour, and so impartial in every Case where Britain is concerned, that we could not but trust to their Determination.

For this Reason, though *Spain* insisted upon the Restitution of the Ships that had been taken from them, yet we could not insist upon the Restitution of any Ships their Privateers had taken from Us; either in the Seas of *Europe* or *America*.

But as a full and final Answer to this and every other Objection that can be made against this Treaty, I must observe, that if we had not accepted of it, such as it was, the *French* would have joined with *Spain* in a War against Us and the Emperor; and to have advised us to engage in such a War, would have been contrary to those wise Maxims which, I have supposed, my generous Patron laid down as the *Basis* of his future Conduct.

As this Treaty in 1721 between *Spain* and Us, and the defensive Alliance concluded at the same time between *France*, *Spain*, and Us, restored a good Harmony between the Courts of *France* and *Spain*; and as the *French* had then no open Quarrel with the Emperor, they were pleased to join with Us in acting, at the famous Congress of *Cambray*, as Mediators for accommodating all Differences between the Emperor and *Spain*; and the Emperor being with great Reason extremely desirous to accommodate his Differences with *Spain*, condescended to accept of our Mediation, notwithstanding the two Treaties above-mentioned. At this Congress, I am convinced, my Patron was seriously inclined to have all the Differences

rences between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* accommodated ; but as *France* never had, nor ever can have, such an Inclination, and as it was contrary to my Patron's supposed Maxims in Politicks, to do any thing but in concert with, and by the Advice of *France*, this Congress was drawn out to a great Length without any Effect.

In the mean time, the Court of *France* put a most heinous Indignity upon the Crown of *Spain*, by sending back the *Infanta*, who had been solemnly betrothed to the King of *France*. This Indignity put an End to all manner of Correspondence between the two Courts. The Court of *Spain* breathed nothing but Fury and Revenge against the King and Kingdom of *France*, and absolutely refused to admit any longer of *France* as a Mediator between them and the *Emperor*; but being more desirous than ever of accommodating all Differences with the Court of *Vienna*, they offered to refer all to Us, and to accept of Us as sole Mediators ; and probably, if we had immediately agreed to this Proposition, we not only might, in the Humour *Spain* was in at that time, have restored a perfect Harmony between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, but we might have got *Spain* into a Confederacy against *France*, which would have put an End to all her tow'ring Projects for extending either her Trade or Dominions.

But as this might have involved Us in a War against *France*, and as *Peace is the greatest Blessing a trading Nation can enjoy*, my Patron foresaw the fatal Consequences of our accepting of that S^t. Mediatisation, therefore he prudently advised Us to refuse it; and as *Spain* would no longer have any thing to do in a Negotiation in which *France* had a Concern, the Congress at *Cambray* broke up, and our Plenipotentiaries

potentiaries retired, after having sufficiently diverted the *French* Ladies with Balls and Entertainments, by which they made *English* Guineas more plentiful at *Cambray*, than in any Country Town of *Great Britain* or *Ireland*.

This, however, was far from putting an End to our Negotiations; for we had now double Work upon our Hands; we had the Differences between *France* and *Spain* to make up, as well as those between *Spain* and the *Emperor*; and as, for these purposes, we were obliged to carry on separate Negotiations at the Courts of *Paris*, *Madrid*, and *Vienna*, it increased the Business and Perquisites of our Messengers, a sort of Gentlemen whose Services in every Station of Life, whether as Post-boys, Bum-bailiffs, Spunging-house Keepers, Informers, or Knights of the Post, may hereafter be of great Benefit to their Country; and therefore every thing that increases their Business, or their Perquisites, must be allowed to be a publick Good.

While my worthy Patron, out of a pure Effect of his innate Goodness, and Love of Peace, was thus perplexing his long Head, and spending the Money of his Country, in the hopeful Project of securing the Tranquility of *Europe*, by putting an End to all the Differences that were then subsisting, or that could in any future time arise, between the several Princes thereof, the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* had the Assurance to accommodate their Differences, and conclude a defensive Alliance, without our Participation. Those who were not in the Secret of Affairs, nor able to discover remote Consequences, pretended that this Treaty was so far from being disadvantageous or dangerous to this Nation, that we ought by all Means to have joined in the

Alli-

Alliance. They, poor Souls! could not foresee, that by this Treaty *Don Carlos* was to become *King of Spain, King of France, and Emperor of Germany*; nor could they foresee, that as Resentment against *France* was the principal Motive with *Spain* for concluding this Treaty, it might probably disturb the Tranquility of *Europe*, by uniting the *Emperor* and *Spain* in a War against our good Ally and firm Friend, the King of *France*. But, thank God! we had other Pilots then at our Helm, Pilots who were certainly as good at smelling a distant Tempest, as ever a *Lapland Witch* was at raising an immediate Storm. Besides, the concluding of such a Treaty without our having a Share in the Negotiation, was certainly, as my Patron thought, a great Affront put upon Us; for it seems to have been always his Opinion, that we ought not to allow any Power in *Europe* to make Peace, without giving Us an Opportunity to make a *Speech*, nor to allow any one of them to quarrel with another, without giving Us an Opportunity to fit out a *Squadron*.

For this reason it became necessary for US, at least it became necessary for *France*, to disappoint the Effect of this Treaty, and to break off that most extraordinary Correspondence which was, by means of this Treaty, established between *Spain* and *Germany*. This, I say, was absolutely necessary for *France*; and could my Patron, from the Maxims I suppose him to have laid down, refuse to assist them in what was so essential to their Security and Grandeur? Therefore he did not pause a Moment in advising Us to agree, by the never to be forgot Treaty of *Hanover*, to concert Measures with *France* for this Purpose; but in this, behold the Wisdom, the Conduct, and the Art of my Patron! He knew that the Danger to

be apprehended from *Don Carlos*'s becoming so mighty a Monarch, was too remote to be viewed in its proper Light by vulgar Eyes ; and he likewise knew, that the People of this Country, from an old ridiculous Prejudice, would be pleased with any thing that seemed to portend Mischief to *France*. For this reason he took special Care not to say a Word of the Danger *France* was in, from this Alliance between *Spain* and the *Emperor* ; and though he took care to mention, yet he touched but slightly upon the Danger *Europe* would be exposed to, by the future Greatness of the Infant *Don Carlos* ; but he knew the Concern we so justly had for the Preservation, of our present happy Establishment, of our Trade, and of the important Fortresses of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, therefore he chiefly employed his Rhetorick in convincing Us, that the *Emperor* and *Spain* had agreed to join in Measures for placing the Pretender upon the Throne of these Kingdoms ; that the *Emperor* was to assist *Spain* in taking *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon* from Us, and that *Spain* was to assist the *Emperor* in Supporting and Establishing the *Ostend* Company, which he said would be extremely prejudicial to our Trade ; and to this he added, that *Spain* had, by this Treaty, granted such particular Privileges in Trade to his Imperial Majesty's Subjects, as would ruin the Trade of this Kingdom with *Spain* ; and that as all the Ports of *Italy* were soon to be in the Hands of the *Vienna* Allies, it would be in their Power to ruin our Trade to the *Levant*, whenever they had a mind. These Arguments had the desired Effect : Addresses came up from all Parts of the Kingdom, with Expressions of Loyalty far exceeding any that had ever been heard of before, and the whole Nation join'd heartily in Measures for freeing *France* from

from the Danger it was then brought into, by means of the Alliance between Spain and the Emperor.

As Envy, Malice, and Disappointment, will always make some People find fault with the wisest and best Measures that can be concerted ; so there were not wanting some discontented Persons amongst Us, that found fault with this necessary and artful Treaty of Hanover ; but as my Patron has always courted Popularity, and has gained the Affections, the Esteem, and the Approbation of the People in every part of his Conduct, the Numbers of the Discontented were as inconsiderable as their Arguments were weak ; and, indeed, the Absurdity of their Arguments was so apparent, and the Answers made to them so solid and convincing, that I cannot help recapitulating some of them. They alledged that, Suppose the Emperor and Spain had concerted such Projects as were represented, we ought to despise them, because no one of these Projects could be executed without a great Naval Force, and it was well known that neither of the Vienna Allies had any Naval Force ; but if these Boutefeus, and Lovers of Discord, had not been blinded by their Malice, they must have seen, that the Emperor, by attacking his Majesty's Dominions in Germany, might have forced Us to do whatever he pleased, and that we had no other way of guarding against this Danger, but by entring into a close Alliance with France.

Being thus drove from their first Argument, they then positively affirmed, that the Allies of Vienna had entred into no such Engagements, and that we had much more Reason to fear such Engagements from an Alliance between France and Spain, which would probably be the Effect of the Treaty of Hanover, than from an Alliance between Spain and the Emperor ;

ror; because *France* was more attached to the Interest of the *Pretender* than the *Emperor*; because it was more the Interest of *France* than of the *Emperor*, to have *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon* taken from Us; because it was more in the Power of the Subjects of *France* than of those of the *Emperor*, to incroach upon our Trade, not only in the *East-Indies*, but also in *Spain* and the *Levant*, and because *France* and *Spain* might have some *Probability* of Success in endeavouring to execute such Projects; whereas *Spain* and the *Emperor* could not have so much as a *Possibility* of Success.

To those who allow *Common Sense* to have any Share in their Politicks, this Argument may appear to have some Weight, but with those who understand *our modern Refinements*, it can be of no Force; for if no such Engagements were entred into by the *Vienna Allies*, the alarming our People with the Fears of such, must either shew the Vigilance and Care, or the Wisdom and Policy of my most excellent Patron: If he was informed that there were such Engagements, and if that Information deserved the least Credit, his giving the Alarm, and providing against them, must shew his Vigilance and Care; for a prudent General, upon the most slight Information of the Enemy's Approach, will put his Army in a Posture of Defence: And if he had no such Information, it shews his Wisdom and Policy, in contriving Methods so proper for making the Nation approve of the Measures he was resolved to advise Us to pursue.

To this, indeed, the malicious, envious and disappointed Pretenders to Patriotism may reply, that if the *Emperor* and *Spain* had really formed no Designs against Us, we had no Occasion to join in any Alli-

Alliance against them, and consequently were under no Necessity to alarm our People with such Apprehensions ; but those who said so, were not sensible of the great Benefits we must reap, and the Security we shall always enjoy, while we keep up a close Friendship with *France*, which we cannot otherwise do than by following their Advice in every Particular. This was the Case at that Time. The Court of *France* had Reason to fear that there were really some secret offensive Articles in the *Vienna* Alliance against *France*, though there were certainly (as appeared afterwards) none against *England*; or at least that *Spain* was then meditating some sort of Revenge against them, and by that Alliance had laid a Foundation for such a Purpose ; therefore it was necessary for them to form a Counter-alliance, and my Patron could not refuse advising Us to join with them, without departing from that which I have supposed he laid down as an inviolable Maxim for his Conduct.

This was the chief Cause of his advising us to join with *France* in the Treaty of *Hanover* ; but besides this there was another ; If we had not concluded that Treaty, we should have been quite destitute of Negotiation, and my Patron was always, I suppose, of Opinion, that foreign Negotiations may be of great Service to Us, both for enabling the great Men we send abroad upon such Occasions, to display their inestimable Talents, and for amusing our People at home, in order to prevent their enquiring too busily into the Management of domestick Affairs. By Negotiation therefore, I suppose, he thinks, we may acquire Honour abroad, let the Persons we send thither be never so mean, and may preserve Tranquillity at home, let our Management be never so bad : and

and that for this Reason we ought, rather than be without, *to negotiate ourselves into a Treaty, if it were for no other Purpose, but to have an Opportunity of negotiating ourselves out of it again.*

My Patron's advising Us to join in an Alliance with *France* by the Treaty of *Hanover*, was therefore so far from being a Blunder in him, that if he had refused to oblige *France*, by advising Us to join in that Alliance, it would have been a most egregious Blunder, and a Departure from those Maxims he laid down, as I have supposed, when he first acquired that Influence which he has since made so good Use of ; for if he had advised Us to join in the *Vienna* Alliance, it would have involved us in a War, in Conjunction with the *Emperor* and *Spain*, against *France*, by which, indeed the Nation might probably have gained great Honour as well as great Benefit; but then our chief General in the War would have gained so much Glory, and so much of his Sovereign's Ear, that he might have presumed to dispose of a Subaltern's Commission in the Army, without consulting my most honourable Patron ; and in the Disposition of such Commissions he might perhaps have been so unwise as to have had some Regard to an Officer's Behaviour in his Military Capacity. Besides, such a formidable Alliance would have made it necessary for *France* to play the Pretender upon Us, in order to stir up, if possible, a civil War in the Kingdom, which they will never attempt as long as we are their humble Servants. And if we had neither joined in the *Vienna* Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, nor in any Counter-alliance with *France*, one of the greatest Men in the Nation, and one of the greatest Ornaments

ments of his Country, would have had nothing to do but to suck an Orange, or pull up his Breeches.

Having thus shewn the Wisdom and Policy of my Patron's Conduct, with respect to the Hanover Treaty; I shall next endeavour to shew, that the Counsels he gave, in pursuance of that Treaty, proceeded from the same Maxims, and were exactly agreeable to the wise Plan upon which all his Counsels are founded. Though the Court of France had a mind to defeat the secret Views of the Vienna Alliance, and to put an End to the Correspondence thereby established between the Imperial and Spanish Courts, they had no mind to break entirely with Spain, and therefore they resolved to get Us to do every thing necessary for defeating the Views Spain had formed from their Alliance with the Emperor. For this Reason, if the supposed secret Articles against Us were really nothing but a political Contrivance, though I am far from making a Doubt of my Patron's being capable of any Thing, yet I am apt to believe, the Court of France had a Hand in this Contrivance; for it served their Purpose to an Ace. As this Nation could not but resent, in the highest Manner, those secret Engagements the Vienna Alliance was charged with, by my worthy Patron's honest Advice we immediately threw up all Correspondence with the Court of Vienna, and sent strong Squadrons of Men of War both to the West-Indies and the Mediterranean, which rejoiced the Heart of every honest Briton, with the Hopes of a sufficient Revenge, and of every brave Sailor with the Hopes of a rich Booty; but as the very fending out of these Squadrons answered all the Ends France intended, they advised, or rather ordered, my Patron to advise the giving of peremptory Instructions to

our Admirals, not to commit Hostilities of any kind. *Spain*, however, looked upon our sending out of such Squadrons as a Declaration of War, and immediately began all manner of Hostilities against Us, which some of our weak Politicians thought was a sufficient Excuse for Us to have made Reprisals, by seizing their rich Plate-fleet then block'd up at *Cartagena* by a Squadron of our Men of War; but by so doing we must have broke with *France*, and as this would have been contrary to those Maxims which I have supposed my Patron laid down for his Conduct, he would have been guilty of that very Fault of which he has been so often accused, I mean an Inconsistency of Conduct, had he advised such Reprisals.

Besides putting the Nation to the Expence of fitting out two powerful Squadrons, which was a considerable Advantage my worthy Patron gained by the Treaty of *Hanover*, he gained many other Advantages by that Treaty; for it furnished us with a large Field for Negotiation; and he easily prevailed on us to augment our Army; to take a Body of *Hessians* into our Pay, and to give large Subsidies to the Powers of the North and to some *German* Princes, all which contributed to the preventing our being able to pay off any of our Debts, or to abolish any of our Taxes; and the unparalleled Patience we shewed with regard to *Spain*, furnished our good Allies the *French*, with the Opportunity of re-establishing a good Correspondence with that Nation; for from our Passivity they took occasion to persuade the Court of *Spain*, that if it had not been for them, we would have taken or demolished many of their Ships and Sea Ports both in *Old Spain* and *America*. By this means the *French* got themselves entirely restored

storied to the good Graces of the Court of *Spain*, and then, as if they had had no Hand in the Quarrel, they pretended to act only as Mediators between Us and the *Vienna* Allies.

The *Ostend* Company was certainly disagreeable to *France* as well as to Us, and the Continuance of that Company was at least as much against the Interest of *France* as against that of *England*; but as the *Dutch* and we had taken the Demolishing of that Company entirely upon ourselves, the *French* pretended to have no Concern in the Affair, and persuaded Us, they had gained a great Point both for the *Dutch* and Us, when they got the *Emperor* to give up that Company by the Preliminary Articles sign'd at *Paris*, *May 31. 1727*; and they likewise perswaded Us, that they had got a most extraordinary Point for Us, when they prevailed on the King of *Spain* to promise, by the Convention signed at the *Pardo*, *March 6. 1728, N. S.* to restore our South-Sea Company's Ship the *Prince Frederick*, and — to raise the *Land Blockade* of *Gibraltar*.

These were Favours for which we can never be sufficiently grateful; but though *France* had recovered a good Correspondence with *Spain*, she had not yet done all her Busines: In order to make herself the sole and supreme Arbiter of *Europe*, she found it necessary to create a Breach between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, and a new Jealousy between Us and the *Emperor*. For this Purpose she perswaded the Court of *Spain* to insist upon a very material Alteration in the Quadruple Alliance, I mean that of having the eventual Succession of the Dutchies of *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, secured by 6000 *Spanish*, instead of 6000 *Neutral* Troops, and of having this Alteration made an Article in their next

Treaty with us. Accordingly, this Alteration was established by two express Articles in the famous Treaty of *Seville*, by which *France* got every Thing she could wish for.

As so much has been said for and against this famous Treaty ; as it has been represented by some, as a most egregious Blunder in my most Admirable Patron, and by others as a most extraordinary Piece of political Prudence, I cannot help taking Notice, that if Gentlemen will but consider the History I have given of it, and the Views *France* had in bringing it about, they will conclude, that notwithstanding the little Satisfaction we got for the Damages we had sustained, and the Expence we had been put to, and notwithstanding the Risk we run of being obliged to join with *France* and *Spain* in a War against the *Emperor*, by means of this Treaty, yet it was perfectly agreeable to those Maxims which I have supposed to have been laid down by my Patron. Therefore his advising Us to agree to this Treaty, was so far from being a Blunder, that it was a most consummate Piece of political Prudence ; and accordingly, those who are wise enough to write upon the same Side with me, were, by this Treaty, furnished with an inexhaustible Fund for Panegyrick and Prophecy. In the former they displayed so much Elegance, and in the latter such a deep Penetration, that I am sure those who read no Pamphlets but such as are given gratis, will be pleased with my repeating some of them. One of the first Advocates for the Treaty of *Seville*, speaking of those who found Fault with it, says, " They flattered themselves with the Hopes of a burthensome War, and they are disappointed by the Conclusion of an *advantageous Peace.*" And surely

“ surely if any Thing could add to the *Pleasure*
 “ which every *honest Englishman* must feel upon so
 “ joyful an Occasion, it must be the Damp it has
 “ struck upon the Spirits and Counsels of those who
 “ have so long laboured to retard and obstruct the
 “ Scene of *publick Felicity*, which now shews itself,
 “ to the utter Confutation of all the Objections rai-
 “ sed against the Measures that have brought about
 “ this *happy Event**.” And again the same Au-
 thor says, “ It cannot certainly be expected that the
 “ same Persons, who were so much alarmed at the
 “ Negotiations, and apprehended so many ill Con-
 “ sequences to themselves from the Conclusion of a
 “ Provisional Treaty, should shew less Concern and
 “ Disappointment upon the News of a *solid and*
 “ *lasting Peace*, or should be less alert and active in
 “ their Endeavours to prevent its becoming gene-
 “ ral.— And indeed, since the Treaty of Se-
 “ ville is *beyond the Reach* of their most artful Ma-
 “ lice, since the *States General* have acceded to it,
 “ and one more Accession might compleat the
 “ Disgrace of those Patriots, and the *Happiness* of
 “ their Country, &c. + ”

As to the introducing of *Spanish Troops* into the strong Places of *Tuscany* and *Parma*, the same Au-
 thor tells us, it could no way prove dangerous to
 the *Peace of Europe* ||, nor could the Emperor be
 under any Apprehensions of Danger on that Head *. And as to what concerned Ourselves in that Treaty,
 this Author defies these Gentlemen, (meaning the
 Patriots) or any body else, to shew in what manner
 these *foreign Acquisitions* (meaning *Gibraltar* and
Minorca) can be more effectually secured, than by
 the

* See *Observations upon the Treaty of Seville*, printed for Ro-
 berts, 1729, p. 4. + Ib. p. 7. || Ib. p. 8. * Ib. p. 11.

the general Confirmation of former Treaties, and mutual Guaranty of Dominions in general, contained in the first and second Articles of the Treaty of Seville †. Then after having told Us, That our Privileges and Advantages in Commerce are, by this general Confirmation and Guaranty, re-established upon the Foot of former Treaties, he says, " That " the utmost Regard had been shewn to the Losses " our Merchants had sustained ; and that by the " Articles of this Treaty our Merchants were en- " titled to Restitution of all Ships and Effects, un- " justly taken from them," to that very Day on which he wrote his prophetical Panegyrick ||. After which he challenges the most clear sighted of these Gentlemen (meaning our Purblind Patriots) to shew, what other Method could have been used for obtaining this Restitution, than that of referring it to Commissaries *. And with the utmost Satisfaction he observes, That the Readiness and Cordiality with which his Catholick Majesty entred into this Treaty, gave Us great Reason to think him sincerely disposed to fulfil punctually the several Engagements of it †.

These are some of the prophetical Panegyricks made by my Fellow-labourers upon the Treaty of Seville, and I am sorry my designed Brevity will not allow me to recapitulate them all ; for though they would make a large Volume, I am sure they would not appear tedious to any Man who has a due Sense of the great Advantages we have reaped by that Treaty. These Prophecies, and many other such Prophecies, were published in the Years 1729 and 1730, and they have been so much verified

† Ib. p. 14. || Ib. p. 14, 15. * Pag. 17. † Ib. p. 19, 20.

rified by Events since that Time, that I hope an implicit Faith will be placed in all the *prophetical Panegyricks* which I, and such as I, may think fit to publish, in relation to our *present Treaty with Spain*, which certainly as much deserves, and, I must confess, stands as much in need of *prophetical Panegyricks and Explanations*, as the *Treaty of Seville*, or any other *Treaty whatsoever*.

Thus far I have traced the *Wisdom and Policy* of my most excellent Patron, and I have shewn his Conduct to be steady and uniform. Indeed, in the Years 1730 and 1731, I was afraid he had committed two very great Mistakes, or had begun to follow different Maxims; but I was soon afterwards convinced that my Fears proceeded only from my being ignorant of the secret Springs of his Actions. In the Beginning of the Year 1730 the *Salt Duty* was abolished, which not a little surprized me; for as this Duty maintains a considerable Number of Officers, it must always be of great Use to a good Pilot when any Storm happens; and as this Duty is grievously felt by the Poor only, and very little felt by any one that has a Vote for Members of Parliament, the abolishing of it could do him no great Service; therefore when I heard of his having consented to give it up, it amazed me: And my Surprise upon this Occasion was the greater, because I knew that our abolishing of this Duty was contrary to the Interest of *France*; for as this Duty lies heavy upon poor Labourers and Manufacturers only, the abolishing of it would encourage our Manufactures, and enable our Merchants to sell them in foreign Markets at a lower Price, which would of Course be a Detriment to the Manufactures and Trade of *France*. For these Reasons, I really began to suspect

spect he had changed all his Maxims, and was from thenceforth resolved to pursue a very different Scheme of Politicks ; and the Treaty concluded, by his Advice, between Us and the *Emperor*, the very Beginning of next Year, confirmed me in my Opinion ; for as this Treaty, in some Measure, renewed the ancient Alliance between *Germany*, *Holland*, and *Great Britain*, I could not imagine, that *France* had consented to our entering into such an Alliance.

These two Deviations, as I supposed them, from his former Conduct, particularly the last, put me into such a Rage, that I resolved to join the Patriots against him ; and if he had pursued such Measures as I imagined were to be the Consequences of these two extraordinary Steps, I should never have drawn my Quill in his favour ; nor could it have been worth my while to have done so ; for Writers, such as I have the Wisdom to be, *who write as the Swiss fight*, can never get much by writing in favour of those Measures which the People in general approve. But I was in a few Years fully convinced of my Error in both these Respects ; for as to the *Salt Duty*, I soon saw that the abolishing of it had only furnished us with a Fund for contracting a new Debt ; and our Behaviour when the *Emperor* was attacked by *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia*, convinced me, that *France* had connived at our entering into an Alliance with the *Emperor*, in the Year 1731, and had, I now suppose, ordered my Patron to advise Us to do so, in order to fix his *Imperial Majesty's* Dependence upon the *Maritime Powers*, and thereby prevent his shewing more Condescension for *Spain* and *Don Carlos* than might be at that time agreeable to the Views of *France*.

Having

Having thus vindicated my Patron from these two seeming Inconsistencies in his Conduct, it will be easy to shew, that his Conduct ever since has been without the least Appearance or Suspicion of Deviation. After the Treaty concluded at *Vienna*, between Us and the *Emperor*, in the Year 1731, another Treaty was concluded at *Vienna*, the same Year, between the *Emperor*, *Spain*, and Us, in which there is an Article which I cannot but take notice of, because it seems to be a Proof of our being then convinced, that no Engagements had been entered into between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, in the Year 1725, that were any way inconsistent with the Interest of *Great Britain*; for, by the very first Article of this Treaty, "The King of *Spain*" consents to renew and confirm, in all their Articles, "Clauses and Conditions, as well the Treaty of *London*, commonly called the *Quadruple Alliance*, as the Peace of *Vienna*, signed the 7th June 1725, between his Sacred *Imperial* and *Catholick* Majesty, and the Holy *Roman Empire* on the one Part, and his said Sacred Majesty the *Catholick* King on the other Part, excepting only with Regard to what is mentioned in the above mentioned Article and Declarations, concerning the Change of the *Neutral Garrisons* into *Spanish Garrisons*." Now I cannot think, that we would have been a contracting Party in any Treaty, for renewing and confirming the Treaty of 1725, if there had been any one Article in that Treaty inconsistent with the Rights, Privileges, or Trade of *Great Britain*.

This, I say, seems to be a Proof of our being then sensible that we had been imposed on with regard to the Secret Articles between the *Emperor* and *Spain* in the Year 1725; but suppose we had then been

likewise sensible, that this Imposition had been put upon us by the artful Management of *France*; yet, notwithstanding the great Expence it put this Nation to, and notwithstanding the unlucky Turn it produced in the Affairs of *Europe*, it would have been wrong in my Patron to have advised our taking notice of, or resenting, this Imposition, because it would have made a Breach between Us and *France*; which was contrary to what I have supposed to be his established Maxims. I must also observe, that this Treaty between the *Emperor*, *Spain*, and Us, was certainly agreeable to the Court of *France*, because it regarded nothing but the Settlement of *Don Carlos* in *Italy*, according to the Method proposed by the Courts of *France* and *Spain*: And though this Settlement of *Don Carlos* seems to have been the only Consideration for our guarantying, in such an absolute Manner, the *Emperor's Pragmatick Sanction*; yet both *France* and *Spain* refused to join with us in that Guaranty; so that it may be said, we were at the sole Expence of settling *Don Carlos* in *Italy*; and for this Purpose we put ourselves to another Expence, the same Year, by sending a strong Squadron of Men of War into the *Mediterranean*, to have the Honour of conducting that young *Spanish Don* to *Italy*, an Honour, by the by, which he took Care not to allow them. These Things I take notice of, only to shew how obedient my Patron has been to the Court of *France*, and consequently how consistent he has been with himself in every Particular; but this will be still more remarkable in what follows.

As we are the great Rivals of *France* in the *Spanish*, *Mediterranean*, and *West-India* Trade, it is the Business of *France* to have Us interrupted in those several

veral Branches of Trade as much as possible; and for this Purpose she has made Use of *Spain* ever since we first began our Negotiations for giving *Sicily* to the *Emperor*, without having any Regard to the Right of Reversion reserved by *Spain* at the Treaty of *Utrecht*. From that time to the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*, *Spain* had set up several unjust Claims and Pretences, under colour of which She had plundered or taken many of our Merchant-ships both in the *Mediterranean* and the *West-Indies*, especially the latter. *France* had taken care that none of these Claims or Pretences should be expressly determined, nor any immediate and compleat Satisfaction for our Losses made by the Treaty of *Seville*; but what was still more extraordinary, notwithstanding the general Stipulations and Promises contained in that Treaty, and the great Confidence we Gentlemen of the *Venal Quill* had taught People to repose in these Stipulations and Promises, *Spain* continued Depredations, and found Pretences for delaying, from time to time, to make any Reparation for those that had been committed before the Conclusion of that Treaty. Our Commissaries had repaired to *Spain*, our Merchants had petitioned our Parliament, and our Parliament had addressed the King, but no Satisfaction or Security had been obtained; when the great and sudden Alteration happened in the Year 1733.

As the firm and steddy Adherence of my Patron to the wise Maxims I have supposed him to lay down, will now appear in their brightest Lustre, I must give a particular Account of this great Transaction. In the Year 1732, the Tranquility of *Europe* seemed to be so well establisched, that one of my Brethren, towards the End of that Year wrote a cu-

rious Pamphlet, for which he was most generously rewarded, which he called, *The natural Probability of a lasting Peace in Europe.* It must be confessed we Brothers of the *Venal Quill* have all a great Itch to Prophecy ; for as we cannot convince a People loaded with Taxes, and fettered by Penal Laws, that they enjoy any present Happiness, we endeavour to comfort them with Hopes of *Halcyon Days* in Time to come : But never poor Prophet published the Visions of his delirious Brain at a more unlucky Season ; for the 1st of February 1732-3, being but a few Months after this solemn Prophecy, *Augustus King of Poland* having died, two Competitors immediately appeared for that elective Crown, viz. the present King of *Poland*, Son of the late King, and King *Stanislaus*, Father-in-law to the King of *France*. As it was inconsistent with the Interest either of *Germany* or *Muscovy*, to have *Stanislaus* made King of *Poland*, they both used Endeavours to prevent his being elected. The *Emperor* made use of peaceable Means only, but the *Czarina* resolved to make use of Force, if nothing else would prevail, because she thought she had from former Treaties a Right to do so. The *Emperor* did not offer to assist the *Muscovites* in the forcible Measures they were resolved to take, nor did he send a Man into *Poland* for that purpose ; and yet, under pretence that he had formed an Alliance with *Muscovy* for excluding King *Stanislaus* from the Crown of *Poland*, *France* entred into a League with *Spain* and the King of *Sardinia*, before any *Muscovites* had entred *Poland*, for stripping the *Emperor* of his Dominions in *Italy*, and in the Month of *October* they attacked him both in *Italy* and upon the *Rhine*.

Now in order to set in the clearest Light, my worthy

thy Patron's Steddiness and Uniformity of Conduct, I must shew the plausible Reasons which the Patriots may say he at that Time had, for advising Us to join the *Emperor* in that War. To reason therefore as a Patriot, (a Thing I am very very little accustomed to, and therefore, if I commit a Blunder, I hope the gentle Reader will excuse me) I must observe, that by the first *Article* of the Treaty of Alliance concluded between the *Emperor* and *Us*, but in the Year 1731, "The contracting Parties expressly obliged themselves to a mutual Defence or Guaranty of all the Kingdoms, States, and Territories, which each of them possessed, and even of the Rights and Immunities which each of them enjoyed, or ought to enjoy, in such Manner that they have mutually promised to one another, that they will, with all their Forces, oppose the Enterprises of all and every one who shall undertake to disturb any of the Contractors, or their Heirs and Successors, in the peaceable Possession of their Kingdoms, States, Provinces, Lands, Rights, and Immunities, which each of the contracting Parties did or ought to enjoy." By the second *Article* of the same Treaty, "His Majesty, moved thereto by his ardent Desire to secure the publick Tranquility, and to preserve the Balance of Europe, and also by a View of the Terms agreed in the following Articles, which are exceedingly well adapted to answer both Purposes, did take upon him the general Guaranty of the Order of Succession established by the *Emperor*, and obliged himself to maintain it, as often as there should be Occasion, against all Persons whatsoever; and consequently he promised, in the most authentick and strongest

"*strongest Manner that could be, to defend, maintain, and guaranty, with all his Forces, that Order of Succession which his Imperial Majesty had declared and established, &c.*" And by the fourth Article it was stipulated, "That all the Articles agreed to, should be *so firmly and reciprocally established, and so entirely decided, that it should not be lawful for the contracting Parties to deviate from them in any wise.*"

I shall not pretend, even as a Patriot, to say that, in consequence of these Articles, we were obliged, in Honour, to assist the Emperor, when he was thus attacked by *France, Spain, and Sardinia*. This Question I shall leave to be discussed by those who are accustomed to deal in *Points of Honour*, which is a Subject no Man that writes in favour of my Patron, *has any Thing to do with*. I shall only, as a Patriot, examine, whether it was upon this Occasion, and at this Conjunction, the Interest of *Great Britain* to have joined immediately in a Confederacy with *Germany, Poland, and Muscovy*, and such other Princes as we might have prevailed on to have joined in that Confederacy; and for this Purpose I must observe, that it was now four Years since the Treaty of *Seville*; in all which Time we had not been able to procure a full Compliance with any one of the clear Articles of that Treaty, (if any such there were) nor a satisfactory Explanation of any of those that were doubtful. We had therefore some Reason to conclude, that *Spain* would never, by fair Means, give us full Reparation for past Injuries, nor a tolerable Security against future. On the contrary, by four Years Experience, we had found, that notwithstanding our Possessions were by that Treaty secured to us, and our Privileges and Advantages in Commerce

merce re-established upon the Foot of former Treaties, beyond all Possibility of Doubt or Cavil, * Spain was every Day raising new Doubts and Cavils, and heaping new Injuries upon the old. For this Reason we could not but foresee, that there was no way of obtaining full Satisfaction or Security but by Force of Arms ; and that while there was such a close Union between France and Spain, as had been established by the Treaties of Hanover and Seville, we could not well propose to make Use of Force without a powerful Alliance.

Such an Alliance, I now write as a Patriot, was formed for us, without our seeking, by the Dispute about the Election of a King of Poland ; we had nothing to do but to join in it, and we might probably have joined upon our own Terms ; for when we are courted to join in an Alliance, we may always make better Terms, than when we are fiddling round Europe, and begging the Princes upon the Continent to assist us. The only remaining Question therefore is, Whether a Confederacy between Muscovy, Poland, Germany, and Britain, was equal to a Confederacy between France, Spain, and Sardinia ; and I believe no Patriot will say, but that, in all human Probability, the former was superior to the latter. As to the other Princes and States of Europe, I say nothing of them ; but I believe it will be granted, by all the Patriots, that by good Management we might have got more of them to have joined with us, than France and Spain could have got to have joined with them ; nay by a few Concessions from the Emperor, and a proper Disposal of some Principalities in Italy, we might, perhaps, they will say, have drawn Sardinia off from the Alliance he was engaged

* Ibid. p. 14.

ged in, or prevented his engaging in it ; for, considering the *Vigilance* and *Penetration* of the *Ministers* we then had at the *Courts* of *France*, *Spain*, and *Sardinia*, no Man will suppose, but that my Patron had Notice of the Intentions of these *three Courts*, long before their *Alliance* was finally concluded ; especially if we consider what *large Sums* have been of late Years allowed for *secret Service*, and how *exquisite a Nose* my Patron has at smelling out a *dome-stick Plot*. Therefore if we were at that Time resolved to have full Satisfaction and Security from *Spain*, the Patriots may say, we ought to have joined the *Emperor*, and for that Purpose we ought to have sent a formidable Squadron into the *Mediterranean*, as soon as we heard of the Conclusion of that *Alliance*. To which they may add, that had it not been for the Self-denial of the *Cardinal*, a Thing ver-y extraordinary in a *French Minister*, we must have joined the *Emperor*, for the Sake of preserving the Balance of *Europe*, when our joining would have been much more dangerous and expensive, than it could have been at the Beginning.

But does not every one see the Weakness of this Way of Reasoning ? We were then carrying on a Negotiation with *Spain*, and to have Recourse to Arms, let the Opportunity be never so favourable, would have been putting a most unreasonable Distrust in our Negotiators, whose Addresis we had often experienced in the many Advantages they had gained for us, and the many honourable Treaties they had engaged us in. *Peace is one of the greatest Blessings a trading Nation can enjoy* ; and will any Man, that loves my Patron, say, that we ought to have engaged in such an expensive War, for the Sake of a few Merchant Ships that had been taken

or

or plundered ; or for the Sake of preserving Privileges or Possessions that are hardly worth keeping ? To which let me add, that the *Dutch* refused to join with us ; and will any Man but a Patriot say, that we ought to revenge any Injury, or attempt to vindicate, by Force of Arms, any of our Rights or Privileges, unless we have the *Dutch* to assist us ?

These are Reasons, and convincing Reasons, of a publick and general Nature ; but, with Regard to my Patron, those who consider the Maxims I have supposed him to lay down, when he first got into that Post, which gave him an Opportunity of retaining, and rewarding so generously that numerous Tribe of Authors who live, not by their *Wits*, but by their *Stupidity* : I say, those who consider these Maxims, must see, that his private and particular Reasons, for advising us not to assist the *Emperor* in the late War, were the same with the Reasons he had for advising us not to join in the Alliance concluded at *Vienna* in the Year 1725, between the *Emperor* and *Spain* ; from whence they must conclude, that his Conduct, in this Case, was exactly of a Piece with what went before, and was a necessary Part of that Series of Wisdom and Policy which I have undertaken to demonstrate.

However, though he advised us not to join in the War, nor to give the *Emperor*, our Ally, any Assistance, yet, in pursuance of the same Maxims, he advised us to make the usual Advantages of that untoward Accident. Upon our Part the War opened a new Scene for Negotiation. We made some new Treaties, granted a new Subsidy to the *Danes*, and, in Conjunction with our good Allies, the *Dutch*, concerted a Plan of Peace, for which the

Powers then at War shewed the utmost Regard, as appeared from the private Treaty soon after concluded between the *Emperor* and *France*; for though; by that Treaty, the *French* got *Lorrain* to themselves, contrary to their express Declaration at the Beginning of the War; yet they did not take so much from the *Emperor* in *Italy* as *Spain* and *Sardinia* had a mind they should. At the same Time we were not idle at Home; we increased our Army, and, to the great Encouragement of our Seamen, fitted out a Squadron, which obliged us to contract some new Debts; and as these warlike Preparations happened just about the Time of chusing *a new Parliament*, they had certainly *a good Effect* upon our *Elections*.

To these Negotiations, and——these Preparations, we ought to ascribe the Moderation of the *French* Court in their Treaty with the *Emperor*, and not to the Policy or Self-denial of the Cardinal, as some of the wicked Patriots have since insinuated; for some of them, I know, insinuate, that this Moderation was a pure Effect of the Cardinal's Wisdom and Policy. They say, the *French* got such a Rap upon the Fingers, by Means of the *ouvert* Ambition of *Lewis XIV.* that they have since resolved to change their Measures. That they then laid *open Siege* to the Liberties of *Europe*, but now are resolved to carry it on *by the Sap*; and to treat Us as the *Jews* treated the Inhabitants of *Jericho*; to amuse Us with empty Shew and Sound, while they are undermining those Walls that are our only Defence against the common Enemy. For this purpose, the Patriots say, it was necessary for the *French* not to aim at too much at once, and that it was Policy in them to leave the *Emperor* some

some Dominions in *Italy*, because it will keep both *Spain* and *Sardinia* steady in the Alliance with them ; that upon the next Occasion they may get hold of *Flanders*, by sacrificing some other Part of the *Imperial* Dominions in *Italy* to their Allies ; and that if we never think of any thing but temporary Expedients, they may find an Opportunity for doing this, when neither the *Dutch* nor we will be able to form such a Confederacy, as will be sufficient for putting a Stop to the Arms of these three Powers thus closely united together ; especially, if in the mean time our Trade should be ruined by the Insults *our Merchants* meet with abroad, and the Taxes *our Labourers* and *Manufacturers* groan under at home.

These, 'tis true, are hideous Prospects ; but these are Spectres which appear to none but those Merchants and Seamen who have been ruined by the *Spanish* Depredations, or those Patriots who have found all their Schemes for repealing the Septennial Act, for preventing Bribery and Corruption, for reducing the Army, &c. defeated by the Art and Vigilance of my honourable Patron. As the Heads of such Men may be supposed to be a little disordered by Disappointments, or by Misfortunes and Want, they may perhaps terrify themselves with such Apprehensions ; but it cannot be supposed that we Gentlemen, who bask in the Sun-shine of Power, and feel no Misfortune but what immediately affects ourselves, should ever dream of such dismal Consequences. Besides, suppose there were really a good Foundation for apprehending such Consequences, they are of such a Nature as in all Probability cannot happen in our Days ; and would any Man have us to disturb the present Tranquility and Plenty

we enjoy, with the Thoughts of what may happen to Posterity?

I shall therefore leave these crazy Men to the Correction of their own melancholy Dispositions, and proceed to observe, that while *Spain* was engaged with our good Friends the *French* in a War against the *Emperor*, we could not be so uncivil as to interrupt their warlike Counsels with any peremptory Applications for adjusting their Differences with Us; nor could they refuse to oblige their Allies the *French*, by interrupting our Trade in the *West-Indies* as usual. Therefore, even during the War, our *Commissaries* continued negotiating *to no Purpose* in *Spain*, and their *Guarda Costas* continued plundering *to very good Purpose* in *America*. At last our *Commissaries*, luckily for their Country, all died or returned home; and as we then found, that no Satisfaction or Security could be obtained by means of the Treaty of *Seville*, we resolved, in order to prevent a War, to begin a Negotiation for a new Treaty. Upon this Occasion I may say, happy was it for Us that my Patron was neither bred a General nor an Admiral; for if he had, he might perhaps from this Experience have concluded, that no Satisfaction or Security was to be obtained by any Treaty or Negotiation, and in that Case would probably have advised an immediate Rupture; but he reasoned more sedately: He considered, that if we attacked *Spain*, or granted Letters of Reprisal, which would be looked on as an Attack, *France* would think herself obliged to assist her Ally the King of *Spain*; in which Case we would be forced to carry on a War both against *France* and *Spain*, without one Ally to assist Us, unless it was the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*: For we could not expect that the *Emperor* would assist Us, after we had so much disengaged him, by refusing him

him that Assistance in the preceeding War, which he thought he was intitled to, by the Treaty we had concluded with him in the Year 1731; and as the Dutch lay open to an Attack by Land, it was not to be expected they would join in a War against France and Spain, without so much as any one Power upon the Continent to support them.

Negotiation therefore seem'd to be the only Means we had left for doing ourselves Justice, or rather for obtaining such Reparation and Security as France and Spain might deign to grant us. This was the very Condition which, I must suppose, my Patron had so long laboured to bring us into; for, as a War against France was contrary to what I have supposed to be his System of Politicks, nothing can manifest the Wisdom and Policy of his Conduct more than its being impossible for Us to hope for Success from any War, in which France might possibly be a Party against Us. Whether this be now our Case, I shall leave to the Patriots to determine; but if it is, they must acknowledge the Wisdom and Stedfastness of him they have so often charged with Blundering and Wavering; and I must acknowledge that, in this Particular, he owes his Success chiefly to the Officers of our Army, who, upon all Occasions, have been ready to approve of his pacifick Measures. However, I would not have these Gentlemen think, he is greatly indebted to them for this Piece of Service; for, as they are secure of being continued in Commission, and — in full Pay, as long as he can have any Influence upon our Councils, no sort of Men in the Kingdom are more particularly interested in preventing a War, than those Gentlemen who have good Commissions in our Army, and who, by the Help of an old Serjeant and a good Dancing-master, and

— by

— by proper Services, *in their civil Capacity*, may hope to arrive at the highest military Preferments, without having ever once experienced the Fatigues or the Dangers of War.

I know the Patriots will say, that though my Patron may have but few Friends in the Councils of any State in *Europe* except *France*, yet the Nation has many; that though none of our antient Allies may put *any Confidence* in him, yet they know by Experience, they may put *a Confidence* in the Nation, when our Government is directed by the Voice of the People, as it was at the End of the Reign of *King William*, and Beginning of that of *Queen Anne*; and that, for this Reason, notwithstanding the little *Use* we have made of a long *Peace*, notwithstanding the many Losses our Trade has lately suffered, yet, if we shoujd put ourselves in *a proper Condition* for regaining the Confidence of our antient Allies, we might easily form such a Confederacy in *Europe* as would prevent *France* from daring to support *Spain* in any Incroachments upon Us. Nay, I do not know but these Patriots may go further: I do not know but they may say, that when this Nation has the good Luck to be under a wise and popular Government, (*which is a Piece of good Luck every one must grant we enjoy at present*) we may, *with a Probability of Success*, engage in a War both against *France* and *Spain*, even without one Ally to assist Us; because they can no way hurt Us but by Sea; and as we are superior in *naval Force* to both, we might prevent its being in their power to do us any great Injury; and at the same time we might ruin their Plantations in *America*, and harrass their Sea-coasts in *Europe*, in such a Manner as would make them glad to accept of Peace upon reasonable Terms. There-

Therefore, these Patriots may conclude, we are not yet reduced to such an unfortunate State, as to have no way left for doing ourselves Justice, *but by Negotiation*, or in other Words, *by begging and praying*; but that we may soon be reduced to such a State, if we should but for a few Years tamely allow our Merchants to be plundered, our Seamen insulted and cruelly used, and our most valuable Rights and Privileges openly and *contemptuously* violated.

But *Peace is the greatest Blessing a trading Nation can enjoy*; and as *Spain* has not yet denied doing us Justice, as she is willing to continue Negotiations with us, provided, we make *no farther Improvements in Georgia*; provided, we do not attempt to hinder her from *searching* our Ships upon the *open Seas*, and making Prize of all such as have any Goods on board, *which she may be pleased to call contraband*; and provided, we do not attempt to hinder her from making Prize of all *British Ships she may meet with* in the Bay of *Honduras*: I say, since *Spain* is willing, *upon these Terms*, to allow Plenipotentiaries to meet,—at *Madrid*, we ought not to go to War, as long as there are Hopes of obtaining *any Thing* by Negotiation.

I think I have now brought my *Series of Wisdom and Policy* pretty near down to the present Time. Our Negotiations for a new Treaty with *Spain* began, I must suppose, two or three Years ago, which occasioned many Letters and Memorials to pass between the Ministers of the two Courts, in which the several Points in dispute were most succinctly and most clearly stated. In the mean time, as the *Spaniards* continued to oblige the *French*, and enrich themselves, by seizing and plundering many of our Merchant-ships in the *West-Indies*, the plundered Merchants

Merchants applied to Parliament, and the Parliament applied to the King for Redress. What did my Patron do upon this occasion ? Why, in pursuance of the Plan, I have supposed he at first laid down, as the *French* were against our taking any violent Measures, *he did not propose to declare War, but to contract Debt.* In this his Advice would not probably have been followed, if we had not obtained the present most honourable Convention ; but even this Convention too, we ought to ascribe chiefly to the Wisdom and Policy of my Patron. He knew the Impartiality of *France*, and the good Inclinations of the Court of *Spain* towards us, better than any other Man in this Kingdom ; and upon these he knew we might depend, even though we should be reduced to that which others might look on as a Misfortune, I mean, that of having nothing else to depend on. Accordingly, when our Case was fairly laid before the two Courts, and fully explained to each, the King of *Spain* from his natural Love of Justice, and great Regard for this Nation, agreed to a Convention, which was at last, after many Alterations and Amendments, concluded at the *Pardo* on the 14th of January 1739, N. S.

As this Convention is a Completion of that Series of Wisdom and Policy which I have proposed to illustrate, I shall state and answer, in a few Words, the most material Objections that have been made to it, by those who envy the Success my Patron has met with, the Honours he has acquired, and the publick Demonstrations of Gratitude and Esteem which have been so justly shewn him by all Ranks of Men in his native Country. These Gentlemen say, that as the only Dispute between the two Nations settled by this Convention is, the Account of Damages, there-

therefore, the only Method we can take for determining, whether this Convention be advantageous for Us or not, is, to examine the mutual Demands between *Spain* and Us, in order to see, whether we are Gainers or Losers by the Settlement of this Account. For this Purpose they compute, that the Value of the *British* Ships and Cargoes that have been unjustly seized and confiscated by the *Spaniards* since 1721, amount at least to *L.* 400,000, without reckoning one Shilling for Interest or Damages; to balance which the *Spaniards* had not so much as a Pretence for any one Claim upon us, but that of the Value of their Ships taken in the *Mediterranean* in the Year 1718, which, even according to their own Reckoning, did not amount to much above *L.* 60,000, so that allowing their Claim to be good, they were *L.* 340,000 in our Debt; and as by *this Convention* we are to accept of *L.* 95,000 in lieu of *L.* 340,000, we must lose *L.* 245,000.

But then they say, the *Spanish* Claim for their Ships taken in 1718, was so far from being good, that even my Patron himself, or at least one of my Brother Authors, who was, upon very good Grounds, supposed to write by his Direction, has long since entirely disavowed that Claim; for after having told Us, " That his Catholick Majesty actually sent " Commissaries, in pursuance of the Treaty in " 1721, to *Port-Mahon*, where the said Men of " War then lay, to demand the Restitution of them, " and that they were really at that Time offered " to those Commissaries, but refused by them, on " Account of their being in a decayed Condition, " and unfit for Service, and were upon that Refu- " sal drawn out of the Harbour by Order of the " Governor, and sunk in the main Sea; " he gives

Some Reasons, such as my Brethren usually give; why this Affair, among others, was referred to the Discussion of Commissaries by the Treaty of Seville, and as the last and best Reason he says, " There was the less Pretence for declining this Discussion, because, we were sure it would upon Examination appear, that it was the Fault of the Spaniards only, that those Ships were not put into their Possession *."

From hence these Gentlemen conclude, that we have by this Convention accepted of L. 95,000 in Lieu of L. 400,000, and consequently are Losers by it to the Amount of L. 305,000; to which, say they, we ought to add the extraordinary Expence we were obliged to put ourselves to this last Summer, which will amount to at least L. 305,000 more; so that by this Convention we lose at least L. 610,000, supposing this Sum of L. 95,000 were to be paid by Spain without any Deductions, and without reserving any Claim upon Us: which is far from being the Case; for by the Declaration or Protestation signed by Spain, our South-Sea Company must pay L. 68,000 of this Money, or lose the *Affiento* Trade, and the remaining L. 27,000 may probably be deducted by Spain, in Lieu of those Ships they may pretend to have restored. This most extraordinary Composition would, they say, have been excusable, if the Spaniards had, in Consideration thereof, particularly and expressly given up all the unjust Claims and Pretences they have of late Years been allowed to set up against Us; but as they have given up not so much as one of them, it was intolerable to discharge so large a Demand for such a trifling

* Observations upon the Treaty of Seville, printed for Roberts, 1734, p. 22, 23.

trifling Sum. It would, say they, have been much better, and more for the Advantage of the Nation, to have left this Dispute likewise to have been settled by the Commissaries or Plenipotentiaries ; for in that Case, if the *Spanisb* Plenipotentiaries had insisted obstinately upon the Claims they have lately set up against Us, ours might have insisted as obstinately upon Payment of the whole Sum due to Us. Our Plenipotentiaries might then have had something to treat of ; whereas by this precipitate (as they are pleased to call it) Settlement of our respective Demands for Reparation of Damages, we have left our Commissaries nothing to treat of, *unless they are to treat away the known Rights of their Country.*

Now in Answer to this I shall admit, that L. 95,000 will be far from satisfying all the Losses our Merchants have suffered by the *Spanisb* Depredations ; but this was all we could get by peaceable Means, and will any one say, we ought to have involved the Nation in a War that might have cost, God knows how many Millions, for the Sake of a few *Hundred Thousand Pounds* due to our Merchants ? Whatever other Gentlemen may think, I am sure my Patron has always been too careful of the publick Money, and too shy of loading the People with Taxes and penal Laws, to think in such a Manner.

I shall likewise grant, that it would have been as proper to have left the adjusting this Balance to our Plenipotentiaries, and perhaps more proper, than to have left to them the adjusting any of those other Pretensions set up by *Spain* against us ; but those who do not know the Advantage of having L. 95,000 to divide among a great Number of

needy Merchants, can have no Pretence to any Knowledge in *modern Politicks*. This Advantage my Patron well knows from long Experience : He knows that the Distribution of this Sum may have a good Effect in making our Merchants submit to future Losses with a becoming Patience and Humility ; and therefore, according to his wonted Prudence, he advised making sure of this Sum, as a necessary Preliminary to our future Treaty ; for as the Treaty, notwithstanding the Time prefixed by *this Convention*, may be *some Years* before it is concluded, it was extremely proper to have such a Sum as this at the Beginning ; and when the Spaniards have taken L. 4 or 500,000 more from our Merchants, we may then be able to prevail with them, to agree to *a new Convention*, and to give us L. 95,000 more, for *a new general Release*. To those therefore that understand any Thing of Refinement in Politicks, this must appear to be a most artful Improvement upon the Treaty of Seville ; for if we had, by that Treaty, got a *stipulated Sum* by way of Reparation of Damages, our Commissaries, named in pursuance of that Treaty, would have met with the same Success they afterwards met with ; and we may assure ourselves, that the *Sum stipulated* by *this Convention* will no way obstruct the Success of the most honourable Gentlemen named therein as our future Plenipotentiaries, who, by their Birth, must command Respect even from the haughty *Spaniard* ; and their former Negotiations shew, that their Qualifications are such as must redound to the Advantage and Honour of their native Country.

I must also admit, that by *the present Convention*, as it now stands, *with the Don de la Quadra's Protest*

test at the Tail of it, our South-Sea Company must pay *L.* 68,000 to the King of *Spain*; so that his Catholick Majesty will have but *L.* 27,000 to pay out of his own Pocket for all the Losses our Merchants have met with; and even that Sum may be greatly diminished, if not annihilated, by the Deductions his Majesty may pretend to make; but if the Government gets a Sum of Money to divide among such of our Merchants as may entitle themselves to a Share of it, what signifies it to my Patron, whether the King of *Spain*, or our own South-Sea Company pays that Money? If his Catholick Majesty has a Demand of any kind upon them, I hope, even the Patriots would not be so unreasonable as to expect that such a great King should be obliged to go to Law with a Company of Merchants: No; if he has any Demand upon them, they must satisfy it, whether they think it just or not; and though they certainly have much greater, and much better founded Demands upon the Crown of *Spain*, they must not pretend to set off, or compensate: Let them apply, *by humble Petition*, to his most Sacred Catholick Majesty, and he will undoubtedly do them Justice.

Having thus, I think, fully answered every Part of this Objection, I shall next, with more Impartiality than Gentlemen of my Kidney are accustomed to, lay before my Readers the only other material Objection I have met with. They argue thus, that, since we have been so imprudent as to set up no unjust Claims against *Spain*, as a Counter-balance to those they have set up against us, it is most ridiculous to refer, by a Treaty, the Differences between us to Commissaries, Plenipotentiaries, or Ministers of any Denomination. To carry on a Negotiation about

about any Difference whatsoever, seems to admit that there is some Doubt about the Right in dispute ; but to refer, by a solemn Treaty or Convention, the discussing of that Difference to any future Congress or Meeting, is a downright Acknowledgment that there is some Ground for a Dispute. Now with respect to every one of the Claims lately set up by *Spain* against us, they are such as we ought never to allow being brought into Dispute, not even by Negotiation, and much less by Treaty ; because they are all such as we ought not, nor can honourably depart an Inch from, unless we are compelled by the Fate of War. *Spain* pretends to search our Merchant-ships upon the open Seas ; (they have the same Right to search our Men of War;) can we allow this, can we allow it under any Regulations ? *Spain* pretends to confiscate our Ships, if they have any Gold, Silver, Cocoa, Logwood, or other Goods, which they are pleased to call *Contraband Goods*, on Board ; can we allow this, can we allow it under any *Regulations* ? *Spain* pretends to exclude the *British* Ships from sailing into the Bay of *Honduras*, or cutting Logwood, upon the Coast ; can we allow this, can we allow it under any *Regulations* ? *Spain* pretends that *Georgia*, and a great Part of *Carolina*, are within their Dominions ; can we give up any Part of that which has belonged to us ever since the Restoration, and for some Time before, without striking a Stroke ? What Pretence then can *Spain* have for desiring, what Excuse can we have for condescending to refer such indisputable Rights to Plenipotentiaries ? The Question is simple, the Answer is the same. A *Courier*, or a *Herald*, may answer such Questions much better than a Plenipotentiary. The only proper Answer we can make to such Questions must be by the Mouths

Mouths of our Cannon. The longer we treat about such Rights, the more disputable we shall make them ; and therefore it is ruinous to establish such Disputes by a Treaty, or preliminary Convention. When any such Right begins first to be contested, it is the Business, it is the Duty, of the Nation to whom the Right belongs, to insist upon an express Acknowledgment of it as a Preliminary to any future Negotiation. If a Nation proceeds in a Negotiation without such an express Acknowledgment, she injures her Right ; if she concludes a Treaty or Convention, and thereby agrees to have any one of her undoubted Rights discussed at a Congress, or Meeting, she in some Measure gives it up. Thus these Gentlemen argue, and from thence, they say it appears, that in every Respect we had done better to have made no Convention, than to have made such a one as the present ; because we have by the present determined that Dispute which ought to have been the last to be determined ; and we have referred to be discussed that which we ought not to have allowed to be disputed.

But these critical Gentlemen forget, that every one of these Rights was contested before the Treaty of *Seville*, and yet they were all left, by that Treaty, to be discussed by Commissaries ; so that, in this Case, we have done no more than what was done by the Treaty of *Seville*: And could we follow a better Pattern than that of so advantageous and so honourable a Treaty? In this Case likewise, my most excellent Patron, (for I must ascribe the Invention to him, or to a near Friend of his) out of the Profoundness of his Knowledge in political Things and political Names, has made a most ingenious Improvement upon the Treaty of *Seville*; for every Man

Man must allow, it is more honourable to have our undoubted Rights treated of, and made doubtful, by Plenipotentiaries, than by simple Commissaries; especially when Gentlemen of such high Birth and established Characters, are appointed our Plenipotentiaries.

Before I have done, I must take notice, that our Patriots pretend to have by this Treaty discovered a sort of Conduct in the Court of *Spain*, which that Court has perhaps made use of in other Cases besides that of the *South-Sea Company*. When the *Spanish* Court have not a mind that any one of their Claims should be given up by the general Words of a Treaty, they enter, it seems, their Protestation at the time of signing the Treaty. Now, say the Patriots, who knows, but that the *Spaniards* have, at the signing of this *Convention*, and at the signing of every Treaty and Convention since the last open War between Us, entred, with reciprocal Accord, a Declaration or Protestation, that nothing contained in that Treaty or Convention should prejudice their Claim to the Restitution of *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*? For, say these Gentlemen, we should never have heard of their Declaration relating to the *South-Sea Company*, if no private Man or Company within this Kingdom had had a Concern in it; and even in that Case, we should not perhaps have heard of it, if it had not been for a Mistake in a certain Gentleman beyond Sea; and as no private Man or Company can have a Concern in any Protestation or Declaration relating to *Gibraltar* or *Port-Mahon*, the Publick can never therefore hear of it, till an open War happens between the two Kingdoms.

As this is a Charge which depends upon a Fact unknown, I shall, in the manner of my Brethren
of

of the *Mercenary Quill*, without knowing any thing about it, boldly and positively affirm, that the Charge is false; scandalous; and malicious; which, I think, is a sufficient Answer.

There are many other Objections made to *this Convention*; but as it would be tedious to give every one of them a particular Answer, I shall make one General Answer for all, which is, That if we had declared War; or committed Hostilities against *Spain*, *France* would perhaps have taken share in the Quarrel; and as the engaging in any War in which *France* may possibly be a Party against Us, is inconsistent with my Patron's political Maxims, therefore it would have been inconsistent with the Uniformity of his Conduct, to have advised Us, upon any Account, or for any Consideration, to have declared War, or commenced Hostilities, against *Spain*; and as our People here at home would not have been satisfied without some sort of Treaty or other, therefore he was obliged to advise Us to accept of such a Treaty as we could get.

Thus, I hope, I have performed what I undertook at the Beginning: I have shewn the Wisdom, the Policy, the Steddingess, and the Uniformity, of my most bountiful Patron's Conduct, from the Time he first began to have any considerable Influence to this very Day, which I hope, nay for the Sake of my Country, and without any selfish Regard, I wish, may be far from being the last Time of his being in a Capacity to bless his Country with his Advice.

Whether I have succeeded or no, I shall leave to my Readers to determine; but I must observe, that, like all those who write upon the same Side with me, I write for those only that are resolved to be convinced, before they know any thing of the Argument.

ment. I do not pretend to convert those stubborn Patriots, whose Madnes is come to such a Height, that they will not be convinced even by *J-s C-r*, the most Eloquent, the most Laconick, and the most successful Orator in the Kingdom; for though his Argument is never above four or five Lines, I could prove, he has convinced more Men, from the highest to the lowest Degree, than all the other Ministerial Orators and Writers put together; nay, that he has often triumphed over all that Justnes and Elegance of Stile, Strength of Reason, and Keeness of Satyr, with which a *B—ke* or *L—n* can write, a *C—t* or *W—m* speak, or a *C—ld* or *P—y* reply.

F I N I S.



